GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Emerging Policy and Practice Issues (2009)
Steven L. Schooner
George Washington University Law School, sschooner@law.gwu.edu

David J. Berteau

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Government Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
West Government Contracts Year in Review Conference (Covering 2009)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

Reprinted from West Government Contracts Year In Review Conference Covering 2009 Conference Briefs, with
permission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2010. Further use without the permission of West is prohibited.

Session 9
EMERGING POLICY & PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program
The George Washington University Law School
David J. Berteau
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington D.C.

I.	NEW DECADE, NEW LEADERSHIP, OLD CHALLENGES
A. Credibility at OFPP. In preparing these materials, it was surprising to realize that – most
likely – this is only the second time in two decades in which the new Administrator of the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), at the time of his/her appointment, was a familiar name to this
community; nor can we recall a prior appointee who had regularly participated in this conference.
Personally, we’re ecstatic with the appointment and confirmation of Daniel Gordon – formerly the
Acting General Counsel of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) – as OFPP Administrator.
See, generally, OFPP Nominee Will Prioritize the Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 398. We remain
disappointed by the administration’s delay in filling this critical position; but we were pleasantly
surprised (nay, flabbergasted) by the Senate’s pre-Thanksgiving acceleration of the process for this
obviously qualified, uncontroversial candidate. We may not understand why he was willing to accept
the job, but we’re grateful that he did. He has got his work cut out for him.
B. Still Waiting at GSA. At least Dan Gordon is on the job. Martha Johnson’s nomination to be
the next administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) remains on hold. Ed O’Keefe,
Key Positions Vacant as Nominees Await Senate Confirmation, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2009) (“Among
executive branch nominees, Martha N. Johnson [nominated in May] has waited the longest.”)
C. Continuing, Daunting Challenges. In all fairness, the Obama Administration inherited a
public procurement regime stretched to the breaking point and under siege. Four trends appear to
dominate that procurement landscape:
(1) the dismantling of the acquisition workforce: the 1990’s workforce reductions rendered
succession planning impossible, increased future risks associated with the pending retirement
bubble, and left the government unprepared for the recent period of dramatically increased
purchasing (and, of course, more on this below);
(2) failure to acknowledge or adapt to two decades of seismic changes:
a. the government evolved from primarily purchasing supplies into an insatiable consumer of services, specifically including professional and personal services; and
b. robust “new public management” initiatives empowered government purchasers to
embrace commercial practices, employ flexible contracting vehicles, and, ultimately,
change business methods in an effort to maximize value for money received and customer satisfaction;
(3) the post-millennium spending binge (more on this below); and
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(4) the inevitable result: scandal and criticism (more on this below
as well).
D. The Obama Administration Procurement Agenda: Lots of
Sail, Minimal Rudder? The most remarkable trend of 2009 was the
Obama administration’s overall approach to procurement policy. Despite
dragging its heels on installing a leadership team, the administration
charted a course of what it perceived as bold action – most dramatically,
touting “savings” and accountability, while permitting special interests to
distract focus from value for money and customer satisfaction. Accordingly,
to date, the Obama administration’s procurement policies lack a cohesive
theme, suggest a reactive rather than proactive approach, strongly indicate
a special interest bias, and, at best, have sent mixed messages at a critical
juncture. For a more optimistic, aspirational assessment, see David Nadler
& Joseph Berger, Feature Comment: President Obama Heralds Change
for Government Contracting, 51 GC ¶ 19.
An Early Nod to Special Interests. Faced with financial and
economic crises, distracted by military action in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and engaged in a high-stakes debate over the future of health care, the
nascent Obama Administration – not surprisingly – did not focus its
resources on establishing its procurement leadership team. Nonetheless,
shortly after the inauguration, the administration issued three prolabor Executive Orders that affect the federal procurement process. Gil
A. Abramson & David W. Burgett, Feature Comment: Executive Orders
Change Labor Rules for Federal Contractors, 51 GC ¶ 34 (“Making good
on his campaign promises to help organized labor, … President Obama
signed three union-friendly executive orders pertaining to federal contractors.”); Executive Orders, Economy in Government Contracting (January 30, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/economy_in_government_contracting; Nondisplacement of Qualified Workers Under Service
Contracts (January 30, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
nondisplacement_of_qualified_workers_under_service_contracts; and
Notification of Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Laws (January
30, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/notificiation_of_employee_rights_under_federal_labor_laws. A week later, in early February,
a fourth pro-labor Executive Order followed. Executive Order, Use of
Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects (February
6, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrderUseofProjectLaborAgreementsforFederalConstructionProjects. This presaged a
willingness to deploy the procurement process to achieve targeted wealth
distribution (favoring, for example, domestic manufacturers, small businesses, and labor, implicitly at the expense of taxpayers, large businesses,
foreign firms, etc.). We would have preferred the administration’s initial
proclamations on public procurement to focus on “value for money” and
end-user “customer satisfaction.”
The March Memorandum. In early March, a Presidential memorandum on “Government Contracting” described concerns with recent trends
in outsourcing, cost-reimbursement contracting, and insufficient competition. The memorandum suggested (and the President’s speeches stated)
that remedying these perceived pathologies would generate significant
© 2010 Thomson Reuters
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savings. The memorandum also highlighted “contracts that are wasteful,
inefficient, subject to misuse[.]” See, Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Briefing Room - Presidential Memorandum on Government Contracting,
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_index_gov_contracting/; David
Nadler & Joseph Berger, Feature Comment: Government Contracting
Developments in President Obama’s First 100 Days—‘No Little Plans”,
51 GC ¶ 143 (“President Obama has set his priorities for broad goals to
be achieved through Government contracts and grants, charted a course
for Government contract reform, and provided billions of dollars in new
opportunities for contractors. Congress has responded to the president’s
agenda with its own series of initiatives, resulting in a deluge of developments….”); James J. McCullough & William S. Speros, Feature Comment:
The Obama Administration’s Emerging Policies on Freedom of Information,
Transparency and Open Government—New Benefits And Costs for Government Contractors?, 51 GC ¶ 125 (“Government contractors likely will need
to expend additional effort to protect their confidential and proprietary
information; … [this] will certainly entail increased transaction costs for
contractors …, which, in turn, will likely lead to increased contract prices
for procuring agencies.”); Paul Debolt, Rob Burton & Terry Elling, Feature
Comment: President Obama Issues Memo on Government Contracting to
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 51 GC ¶ 77 (“Government must … issue ‘tough new guidelines….’ [T]he president described
the procurement system as “broken” and stated that the Government has
lost the public trust. … [C]oncerns … highlighted by the president were
fraud, massive cost overruns, contractors overseeing other contractors,
and a lack of oversight and accountability.”); OMB Issues Contracting
Reform Guidance, 51 GC ¶ 384 (“The president directed OMB and federal
agencies to develop guidelines to achieve goals intended to save up to $40
billion each year.”).
We remain unconvinced by the dramatic rhetoric promising savings;
nor do we believe that the system is capable of generating credible data
demonstrating or validating the promised positive results. See, e.g., Office
of Management and Budget, Acquisition and Contracting Improvement
Plans and Pilots: Saving Money and Improving Government (December
2009), www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/reports/2009_acquisition_contracting_improvement.pdf (“President Obama believes that taxpayers
deserve to have their dollars spent wisely. To help instill a new sense of
responsibility … he has charged federal departments and agencies with
saving $40 billion annually by Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 through terminating
unnecessary contracts, strengthening acquisition management, ending the
overreliance on contractors, and reducing the use of high-risk contracts
across government.”) For example, we are concerned that deferring necessary expenditures to later fiscal years may be confused with savings and
that aspiration may not comport with reality. “DoD expects to get a new
presidential helicopter ‘for a lot less money than the cancelled program
would have cost had it continued.’” USD AT&L Addresses KC-X Procurement, JSF at Media Roundtable, 51 GC ¶ 417.
The July Memos: Less Flash, More Substance. In late July, the
administration expanded upon these policies by issuing memoranda
that: (1) mandated savings and advocated reduced use of high-risk con-
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tracting vehicles (such as non-competitive and/or cost-reimbursement
contracts); (2) provided guidance to help agencies improve their management of the multi-sector workforce (a more constructive approach
to the earlier anti-outsourcing rhetoric); and (3) injected rigor into the
government’s ineffective process for obtaining, managing, and employing
contractor performance data. OMB Issues Contracting Reform Guidance, 51 GC ¶ 271; Peter R. Orszag, Improving Government Acquisition, Office of Management and Budget (M-09-25, July 29, 2009), www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m-09-25.pdf; Peter
R. Orszag, Managing the Multi-Sector Workforce, Office of Management
and Budget (M-09-26, July 29, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
memoranda_fy2009/m-09-26.pdf; Lesley A. Field, Improving the Use of
Contractor Performance Information (July 29, 2009), Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/procurement/
improving_use_of_contractor_perf_info.pdf.
And Even More Executive Orders. By October, Green Procurement had become a priority, adding layers of complexity to a broad range
of acquisitions. Mary Beth Bosco, Feature Comment: Executive Order on
Environmental and Energy Performance Changes Government Acquisition of Buildings and Services, 51 GC ¶ 363 (“[T]the policy … shall be to
‘leverage agency acquisitions to foster markets for sustainable technologies and environmentally preferable materials, products, and services,’
and ‘design, construct, maintain, and operate high performance sustainable buildings in sustainable locations.’” The “executive order can be
broken down into four mandates: (1) establishment of greenhouse-gas
percentage emissions goals; (2) articulation of specific action goals; (3)
designation of responsibility in the Government for implementing the
order’s requirements; and (4) recommendations for siting and operation
of Government buildings.”). In November, President Obama issued an
executive order intended to help agencies reduce improper payments.
President Issues Executive Order To Reduce Improper Payments, 51
GC ¶ 416 (requiring agencies to reduce payment errors and eliminate
waste, fraud and abuse in federal programs while ensuring that proper
beneficiaries continue to have access to federal programs and funds); 74
Fed. Reg. 62201 (November 25, 2009).
A Telling Anecdote. The administration’s optimism suggests that
the Government can have it both ways. In pursuing initiatives to stimulate a stalled economy with government spending, the administration
mandated increased transparency and oversight in public procurement
(and government, generally) and reiterated concerns regarding contractor compliance. (At the same time, the administration seems to favor
targeted allocation of procurement benefits to special interest groups.)
That is all fine, if there is some recognition of the source of the problems
that lead to contractor compliance failures that underlie the accountability concerns. We found it particularly disingenuous, for example, that
the administration acknowledged a profound, generational deficiency in
the acquisition workforce, yet promised a massive spending (stimulus)
splurge to be simultaneously accompanied by higher – previously unprecedented – levels of oversight and accountability. OMB Issues Stimulus
Implementing Guidance, 51 GC ¶ 60.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters
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II.

HOW LONG CAN THE Upward Trend CONTINUE? The
POST-MILLENIUM, Procurement Spending BINGE
SPANS THE DECADE

A. The Burn Rate Keeps Burning. Throughout the past decade,
we continued to be surprised by the increased volume and rate of federal
procurement spending. The experts swore that the growth would taper,
and, to some extent, the growth rate did slow somewhat, but not for long.
In retrospect, the dire warnings that the current spending increase was
a blip – and that procurement spending would promptly retract – were
unfounded. Has the growth cycle finally run its course?
Federal Procurement Spending 2000-2009*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement Spending (in
Billions)
FPDS v. USASpending

2009

$409.7*

2008

$531.2 $529.8

>11.5

3.8

2007

$465.6 $463.1

12.0

2.8

2006

$415.4 $426.6

6.6

3.2

2005

$389.6 $385.9

8.9

3.4

2004

$357.7 $341.2

9.6

2.7

2003

$326.4 $297.8

18.6

2.3

2002

$275.2 $258.9

17.0

1.6

2001

$235.2

7.2

2.8

2000

$219.3

Percentage Increase
From Previous Year

Percentage Increase
in Consumer Price
Index (CPI)
1.8

*FY 2009 reflects preliminary reporting.

See Federal Procurement Data System, Trending Analysis Report,
available at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/top_requests/FPDSNG5YearViewOnTotals.xls, and Agencies Submitting Data to FPDS-NG, available
at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/agency_data_submit_list.htm. See also,
USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://
www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm#2009.
We recognize that this run of increases will end, and defense budgets,
in particular, eventually will come down. It probably will not happen in FY
2011, but it will occur soon thereafter. Whether defense budgets start coming down next year or later is irrelevant. What’s important is that neither
Congress nor the DoD is ready to deal with declining defense budgets. See,
generally, David J. Berteau, Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee, Resourcing the National Defense Strategy: Implications of
Long-Term Defense Budget Trends (November 18, 2009); see also David
J. Berteau, Current Issues: No. 19: Fixing the Shortfalls: Defense Budget
Trends and Long Term Impact (12/14/09), CSIS, Defense-Industrial
Initiatives Group, http://csis.org/publication/diig-current-issues-no-19fixing-shortfalls-defense-budget-trends-and-long-term-impact.
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B. Data Quality: Incremental Improvement. Due in large part
to the introduction of USASpending.gov, the procurement spending data
that the public enjoys access to continues to improve, but it remains far
from perfect.
[GAO’s] William Woods … testified that deficiencies in the
current systems involve mainly poor data quality, lack of data
submission and inadequate system capabilities. … [OMB
Watch’s] Adam Hughes … agreed that the current systems do
not deliver accurate, timely and useful information. He called
them “disjointed, antiquated, at times redundant, and extremely
difficult to use.” … Vivek Kundra, OMB’s federal chief information
officer, testified that the Obama administration recognizes the
problems with the current contractor databases, including data
timeliness, accuracy and completeness, and system usability.

Senate Subcommittee Examines Contracting Databases, 51 GC ¶ 345. Consider, for example, that the government still lacks a means for quantifying
money actually spent on contracts, as opposed to the amount of dollars
awarded. And all of these numbers, of course, exclude grants. Although
the volume of government funds dispersed annually on grants exceeds
that spent through contracts, grant spending remains less transparent
and subject to far lesser scrutiny. All things in time.
III.	ENOUGH Outsourcing, Contracting Out, AND
Privatization: A New INSOURCING Trend?
Last year, we noted that the government’s bipartisan outsourcing (or,
at times, “competitive sourcing”) initiative had spanned more than fifteen
years (and two two-term administrations). This year, insourcing is all the
rage. Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, at the recent Aerospace
and Defense Conference in New York, conceded that DoD lacks sufficient
expertise and proficiency in cost estimating, systems engineering, and
program management. Lynn described “rebalancing” the federal and contractor workforces as a key element of overall acquisition reform.
The outsourcing versus insourcing debate has solidified itself as a
mainstream topic of public discourse. On the one hand, we’re pleased to
see issues related to public procurement penetrating the public consciousness. Conversely, we remain concerned that the public does not like what
it is seeing about our profession and/or industry.
It is easy to see things have gone awry and to scapegoat
contractors. But contractors aren’t the problem; the problem is
the loss of good government….
If regular government channels are inadequate to handle the
biggest challenges the nation faces, it is hard to avoid concluding
that something is terribly wrong with our current national
security infrastructure….
[T]here can be bad privatization and good privatization and
government can ensure that the latter prevails. Bad privatization
empowers the beltway bandits….
© 2010 Thomson Reuters
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Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy, 11, 60, 133 (Yale University
Press, 2009) (emphasis added).
[C]riticism about America’s foreign policy being outsourced to
the private sector has resurfaced with a vengeance....
Sure, government needs to be better at managing contractors.
Sure, it needs to bring certain skill sets … back into government.
And sure, we could always use even more transparency on
government spending. Yet … the devil is in the details….
More importantly, the critics … have yet to present an analysis
showing how the costs of contracting outweigh the benefits. They
warn of contracting run amok and the privatization of foreign
policy but seemingly forget that in times of war, meeting the
warfighters’ needs in a timely manner is a primary task of the
government, even if this costs more than we would like it to. And
… critics … should also recognize that having a private sector
that can surge in support of expeditionary operations increases
the nation’s ability to project power and the credibility of its
deterrence.

Guy Ben-Ari, Current Issues: No. 18: Addressing Concerns About US
Foreign Policy Outsourcing (12/02/09), CSIS, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, http://csis.org/files/publication/ 091202_DIIG_Current_issues_n18.pdf.
We remain unpersuaded by much of the insourcing rhetoric. We also
sense that much of the insourcing activity, particularly at DoD, is quotadriven, rather than results-oriented. No doubt, the picture will be more
clear by this time next year.
IV. Acquisition Workforce: FINALLY, SOME ACTION
Last year, we were pleased that the acquisition workforce was increasingly, and seriously, addressed—both as a matter of policy and legislation.
(We apologize here for attempting to summarize the well-traveled tale
that brought us to this point. The federal acquisition workforce declined
dramatically due to congressionally mandated personnel reductions in
the 1990’s. We agree with those who assert that the government has not
hired an appropriate number of new acquisition professionals in any year
since the 1980’s. A disproportionate share of the existing workforce is
aging and, in large part, retirement-eligible; and most of that workforce
was neither hired nor trained to primarily purchase services using flexible contractual vehicles. In addition, as discussed above, the volume of
purchasing exploded during this decade.)
Now that the trends are not only documented, but, increasingly, acknowledged, we are starting to see meaningful action. OFPP Nominee
Will Prioritize the Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 398; Treasury IG Finds
Insufficient Training for Recovery Act Oversight, 51 GC ¶ 375 (We were
not surprised to see, e.g., “an internal memorandum [that] indicated that
additional contracting staffing was ‘not required for execution of remain-
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ing acquisitions’ under the Recovery Act. … [A]lthough the Recovery Act
increased the contracting workload, the increase was ‘accommodated ...
primarily by reprioritizing non-Act procurements and working additional
hours.’” Sound familiar?); Acquisition Workforce Competencies Rise As
Retirement Threat Looms, FAI Survey Shows, 51 GC ¶ 288; Senate Subcommittee Focuses On Acquisition Workforce Reform, 51 GC ¶ 280; DoD
Seeks Better, More Acquisition Professionals, 51 GC ¶ 259 (DoD’s Shay
Assad touts 20,000 new acquisition employees by 2015; Schooner responds
that the number is too low, and the movement is too slow.); Experts Tell
House Subcommittee About Federal Contracting Challenges, 51 GC ¶ 213
(Karen Manos highlighted the Government’s “overworked, under-trained
and underappreciated acquisition workforce”); DPASS and Service Update HASC Subcommittee on Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 150 (“[DAU]
must be expanded because certification requirements have exceeded its
capacity, and the joint contracting workforce must be properly sized and
trained to meet contracting needs in a battlefield environment”); DOD
Needs Additional Information To Manage Acquisition Workforce, GAO
Says, 51 GC ¶ 117.
As Vern Edwards correctly articulates, the numbers game is only part
of the problem:
[T]he problem is not just quantity, but also quality. It is an
open secret that the current workforce is not entirely up to the
job of conducting contracting operations efficiently, effectively
and in compliance with the law. … COs do not fully understand
the Government’s complicated rule system and rely too much on
agency attorneys to tell them the rules. …
The hiring surge is injecting many people into a system that
is not ready to receive them or to develop and retain first-rate
professionals. ...
[T]he Government’s primary approach to workforce
revitalization, which is to overwhelm the workload problem with
numbers, will result in needlessly higher labor and training
costs, suboptimal worker performance and suboptimal retention
rates among the best new hires.
FAI and DAU must be revitalized. They need new
management and more money. …The quality of the educational
institutions should reflect the quality of the new hires, who have
more formal education than the current generation. The new
educational programs must be intellectually sophisticated and
professionally rigorous….

Vernon J. Edwards, Feature Comment: Throwing People at the Problem –
Massive Hiring Will Not Revitalize the Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 288.
We share Vern’s concern that new personnel must be properly trained,
allocated, mentored, incentivized, and, over time, developed. We also are
curious to see if results stem from the nascent Strategic Partnership on
Acquisition Recruitment Coalition (SPARC), comprised of representatives
from the OFPP, the Chief Acquisition Officers Council, the Federal Acqui© 2010 Thomson Reuters
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sition Institute (FAI), the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), and the
National Contract Management Association (NCMA). We are optimistic
that the partnership can persuade institutions of higher learning to expand
their curriculum to include procurement-related coursework. We are also
encouraged, on this score, by the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
of 2009 (“[t]o improve the acquisition workforce through the establishment
of an acquisition management fellows program), introduced by Senators
Susan Collins (R-Maine), Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), and Bob Bennett (RUtah) shortly before this chapter was completed.
V.

MAJOR SYSTEMS: MAJOR CHANGE?

A. The Tanker Procurement: A Continuing Major System Acquisition Case Study. Last year, we noted that the Obama administration would inherit one of the hottest potatoes imaginable—the future of
in-flight refueling for the Air Force. This incredibly important, high-profile
procurement has attracted (and, frankly, merited) extraordinary attention. Alas, we are not optimistic about the current request for proposals.
Indeed, we think Ralph Nash got it right:
[We previously] criticized the Air Force for structuring the
procurement … as a paper competition when it could have used
the money to buy prototypes and conduct a fly-off to determine
which prototype was better. ... Now the Air Force is starting
over again and guess what[?] … conducting a better paper
competition!
***
[T]his is the wrong way to procure an aircraft that is based
on an aircraft that already exists. The right way to do it is
to give each company half of the development funds to build
prototypes and conduct a fly-off to see which prototype is the
best plane. At the same time the fly-off is being conducted, the
companies could submit firm prices based on the data that
have been gathered building the prototypes – giving some
assurance that the prices were realistic. Further, the millions
of dollars of company money spent on preparing proposals and
participating in the paper competition could be used to design
and build the prototypes.

Ralph C. Nash, Dateline, 23 N&CR (November 2009). We will go one better. Why not give the two major players funds to provide two prototypes
each – one large, one smaller. Then deploy the four tankers – for a year or
even longer – and let the end users weigh in. Imagine an outcome where
both pricing and technical performance are based on experience! Not to
belabor the point, but DoD’s latest guidance seems to agree. See, Ashton
B. Carter, DUSD(AT&L), Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027 Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
(December 4, 2009), directing that:
Program acquisition strategies for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAPs) shall describe the measures taken to ensure
competition or the option of competition, at both the prime and

9-9

© 2010 Thomson Reuters

NOTES
subcontract level throughout the program life cycle. Measures
may include, if cost-effective: competitive prototyping; dualsourcing ….

Is that: “do as I say, not as I do?” Or is it a concession that doing the right
thing is rarely “cost-effective” in the short-run? See, generally, Northrop
Threatens To Quit KC-X Procurement, Seeks Favorable Terms, 51 GC ¶ 425;
USD AT&L Addresses KC-X Procurement, JSF at Media Roundtable, 51
GC ¶ 417 (“DoD knows ‘very well what aircraft the warfighter wants, [and]
what kind of requirements there are,’ which allowed for a ‘crystal-clear’
draft RFP. … [T]the source selection strategy is ‘much less subjective’”).
B. A Less Detailed, More Proactive Agenda. One of us recently
offered what we perceive as five key elements, which, if present, would
lead to improvement in defense acquisition and permit the government
to expect better performance at more predictable and stable prices.
1.

Restoring DoD’s acquisition workforce capability is critical; of
course, this will take sustained effort over time.

2.

Competition is critical; we need to foster more of it.

3.

Programs need clear requirements, better cost estimates, and
more mature technology.

4.

Requirements should not be locked in. Contract solicitations and
negotiations need to focus more on tradeoffs of requirements,
cost, and schedule. Secretary Gates’ 75% solution, achieved
faster and at less cost, demands flexible requirements. Achieving
success also demands stronger negotiating teams on the government side, as well as a willingness to avoid taking the easy way
out by picking companies who “buy in” to contract award.

5.

It will take more time up front (for requirements, cost estimating, technology maturity, and negotiations) to do this better, but
that will pay off in the long run.

David J. Berteau, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, If These Are Such Good Ideas, Why Are They So Hard To Implement?
(April 30, 2009); see also Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise (July 2009),
www.bens.org/our-work/policy-agenda/defense-acquisition-new.html
([A] recent effort counted … some 262 relevant studies, reports, and publications … developed and presented on this issue since the landmark
Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986. … [A]ll of them urged significant
reform to the nation’s defense acquisition system. Looking even further
back, … the Hoover study of 1949, the Fitzhugh Commission of 1970, the
DeLauer panel of 1978, and the Packard report of 1986 (which led to the
Goldwater-Nichols reforms), all … made similar pleas.)
It may be premature to conclude that major change has come to the
major systems acquisition regime, despite the good intentions behind the
Weapons Systems Acquisitions Reform Act (WSARA). President Signs
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 51 GC ¶ 184; HASC Marks Up
Weapons Acquisition Reform Act, 51 GC ¶ 152; House Budget Committee
Reviews DOD Weapon System Procurement, 51 GC ¶ 96; SASC Considers
© 2010 Thomson Reuters

9-10

NOTES
New Weapon Acquisition Bill, 51 GC ¶ 80; Systemic Problems Continue to
Dog Weapons Acquisitions, GAO Says, 51 GC ¶ 61; Vernon J. Edwards &
Ralph C. Nash, The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009: An
Empty Vessel, 23 N&CR ¶ 38 (“Frustrated by program outcomes and its
own impotence, and self-deluded or dishonest about its own contributions
to the problems, Congress scans Government Accountability Office and
agency Inspector General reports, holds hearings, pontificates, lectures,
chastises, and then enacts legislation.”).
C. Intriguing Anecdotes. We hope that poignant lessons learned
from prior programs are not ignored.
[T]he A-12 default termination provides a fascinating example
of the exceedingly high risk that is imposed on a contractor that
signs a fixed-price contract to develop a new weapon system....
Contractors should adopt the Nancy Reagan solution—just say
no.

Ralph C. Nash, Fixed-Price Research and Development Contracts: A Risk
Too High, 23 N&CR ¶ 39; Report Parses Coast Guard’s Deepwater Acquisition For Lessons, 51 GC ¶ 14 (Deepwater … offered the Coast Guard a
political opportunity to gain greater interoperability with the Navy while
serving as a pilot for other programs. … [A]fter a period of downsizing and
retrenchment, the project offered the Coast Guard a chance to ‘serve as
a model for engaging industry as a partner in lowering overall contracting costs by transferring more contract management responsibilities to
the vendor.’ … Deepwater ‘catapulted the Coast Guard to the forefront of
contracting and systems engineering practice and … exposed the Coast
Guard … to significant risk.’”); Trevor L. Brown, David M. Van Slyke &
Matthew Potoski, The Challenge of Contracting for Large Complex Projects:
A Case Study of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program, www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/BrownReport.pdf.
D. OCI’s: Reversing the “Last Supper.” We are not alone in wondering whether Northrop Grumman’s sale of TASC, a government consulting
division, to comply with the WSARA’s new organizational conflict of interest
(OCI) requirements is an isolated incident or a harbinger. Northrop CEO
Ronald Sugar explained that the sale “reflects Northrop Grumman’s desire
to align quickly” with the new WSARA OCI standards. DoD has until March
2010 to propose rules governing how contractors that provide advisory
services and develop weapon systems should deal with such conflicts. See,
generally, Industry and Watchdog Organizations Comment on DOD OCI
Requirements, 51 GC ¶ 426; Ralph C. Nash, Postscript(s) II and III: Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 23 N&CR ¶¶ 65, 60 (“The … statutes … make
no allowance for firewalls between a division of a company providing support
services and a division producing products or performing contract work.
They … seem to assume that there should be an absolute ban on divisions
of the same company performing these two types of effort. This will be the
most difficult issue when the statutes are implemented.”). At a DoD public
meeting to discuss OCIs, the Professional Services Council’s Alan Chvotkin,
called for “a balanced approach that recognizes the symbiotic partnership
that must exist for success.” We concur.
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VI. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Private Security
The fundamental issue facing [DoD] “after more than eight
years of war is that it still does not have a coherent system for
addressing the urgent needs of operational commanders in the
field….” The procurement system “simply is not agile enough to
enable commanders to respond quickly, and in the most effective
way possible, to the demands for countering” unanticipated
battlefield developments such as the use of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). The enemy “employs easily obtainable, off-theshelf technology to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. military
operations….” “Yet DoD has made no permanent institutional
changes in its acquisition, programmatic and budgetary systems
to account for the growing sophistication and flexibility of the
threat.”

Dov Zakheim, former defense undersecretary (comptroller), October 8,
2009 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. Defense
Acquisition Reform Panel Acknowledges Success, Considers Rapid Acquisition, 51 GC ¶ 392.
Three traits define post-9/11 war-time field contracts: they are
located in Iraq (55% of overall); they are undertaken by the
U.S. Army (70% of overall); and they are for providing logistics
and infrastructure (69% of identified services). Since 2005
Afghanistan, which has a higher ratio of civilian spending,
is receiving more dollars but even after three years of steady
growth that theater only obtained 24% of 2008 field contracts.
Policy changes [such as the recent legislative] mandate that core
aspects of interrogation of the military’s prisoners be handled
by government personnel, may decrease reliance on contractors
in specific areas. However, the broader dependence on logistics
contractors is unlikely to change absent a major reduction in
demand for field services.

Gregory Sanders, Current Issues: No. 17: Contracting for Operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan (11/05/2009), CSIS, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group,
http://csis.org/files/publication/091105_DIIG_Current_Issues_n17.pdf.
The most intriguing question, at a macro level, is whether the Afghanistan experience will demonstrate that, institutionally, the government
learned from, or simply repeated, its Iraq experience. See, generally, State’s
Reliance on Security Contractors Continues to Grow, GAO Says, 51 GC
¶ 428; DOD IG Focuses on Force Protection, Fuel Procurement in Contingency Operations, 51 GC ¶ 427; DOD IG Recommends Better Management
of Commercial Vehicle Acquisitions in Iraq, 51 GC ¶ 419; Contracting
Committee Mulls Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Contractors, 51 GC
¶ 405; CWC Revisits DCMA, DCAA And Contractor Business Systems, 51
GC ¶ 399; SIGIR Recommends Better DOD Management of Iraq Development Fund, 51 GC ¶ 392; DOD IG Finds LOGCAP Transition Planning
Weaknesses, 51 GC ¶ 344; CWC Focuses on State Department Contractor
Employee Misconduct, 51 GC ¶ 328; ABA Recommends Uniform PSC Rules,
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51 GC ¶ 314; CWC Scrutinized Translation Contract, 51 GC ¶ 299; CWC
Assesses Contractor Business Systems, 51 GC ¶ 298; New Rapid Response
Acquisition Agency Needed, DSB Task Force Says, 51 GC ¶ 246; Army
Contracts for NTVs Used in Afghanistan Need More Oversight, 51 GC
¶ 215; CWC Testifies on the Path Forward in Iraq, Afghanistan, 51 GC
¶ 205; House Bill to Reform PSC Oversight Introduced, 51 GC ¶ 161; LOGCAP IV Still Faces Challenges, CWC Finds, 51 GC ¶ 161; DCMA Should
Tighten CAS, FAR Controls for Iraq Reconstruction, IG Finds, 51 GC
¶ 138; Commission on Wartime Contracting Holds First Hearing, 51 GC
¶ 41; Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Contractor’s Tort Liability for Battlefield
Conduct, 23 N&CR ¶ 57.
Incremental Progress: Transparency Into Contractor Fatalities
and Injuries. Last year, we expressed frustration that contractor fatalities (and injuries) remained generally outside the public’s consciousness.
We believe that, in a representative democracy, public awareness of the
human cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. We are
encouraged that the government has begun to at least keep track. GAO’s
John Hutton explained: “Reliable, meaningful data on contractors and the
services they provide are necessary to inform agency decisions on when and
how to effectively use contractors, provide support services to contractors,
and ensure that contractors are properly managed and overseen[.]” And,
while we might be disappointed with the Synchronized Predeployment
and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database concept and implementation,
we commend the Labor Department for a giant step towards transparency.
See, generally, www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. The Labor
Department recently began posting on the Internet the data it generates based upon claims filed under the Defense Base Act, and the War
Hazards Compensation Act, which make contractor employees eligible for
worker’s compensation benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act. Remember Them, Too: Don’t Contractors
Count When We Calculate the Costs of War? Washington Post A21 (May
25, 2009); DOD, State, USAID Need Timeframe for SPOT Database, 51
GC ¶ 392; Government Continues to Implement Contractor Database in
Iraq, Afghanistan, 51 GC ¶ 118 (“DOD has entered around 70 percent of
its contractor population”).
VII. THE TOXIC ENVIRONMENT
Last year, we reprinted a seemingly incendiary quote suggesting that it
had “become almost impossible to open a newspaper and not read of some
well-connected and obscenely compensated contractor foisting a colossal
botch on the taxpayer.” Thomas Frank, Government by Contractor Is a
Disgrace, Wall St. J. (Nov. 25, 2008). We noted that this public perception is widely accepted and, in large part, seems to have been embraced
by the incoming administration. We find this caricature not conducive to
meaningful discourse, and we continue to wait for the administration to
soften its stance. At a recent not-for-attribution discussion, a retired senior official noted that: “Contractor fraud, waste, and abuse is to the left
what ‘welfare queens’ are to the right.” That seems no less apt than Jack
Gansler’s popular new moniker for the current environment: the “Global
War on Contractors.”
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A casual observer should be forgiven for concluding that procurement
policy today is being driven primarily by the inspector general and audit
community. DPAPSS Addresses DCAA Criticism, 51 GC ¶ 364; Congress,
GAO Call for Reform at DCAA, 51 GC ¶ 333; Industry Questions DCAA
Approach to Audit of Compliance With Mandatory Disclosure Rule, 51 GC
¶ 234; Experts Tell House Subcommittee About Federal Contracting Challenges, 51 GC ¶ 213 (Karen Manos noted that DCAA “has adopted aggressive
new audit policies that are wreaking havoc on the Government procurement world.” DCAA has strayed from its primary mission, “and appears
to be focusing its efforts on ‘systems’ audits that are time-consuming and
disruptive and often have little if anything to do with actually protecting
the Government against unallowable costs[.]”); IGs Offer Suggestions For
Increased Contractor Oversight, 51 GC ¶ 145; GAO Finds Weaknesses In
DOD Professional and Management Support Contracts, 51 GC ¶ 415; Many
Contractors Had Acceptable Ethics Programs Before New FAR Requirements,
GAO Finds, 51 GC ¶ 346; Cutting Contracting Waste Would Save Tax Dollars, Obama Tells VFW, 51 GC ¶ 308; Robert L. Vogel, Feature Comment:
The 2009 Amendments to the FCA, 51 GC ¶ 342 (The Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) “expanded the substantive liability provisions of the Act to cover situations that were not [previously] covered …
[and] expanded the Government’s ability to use powerful civil discovery
devices, civil investigative demands (CIDs), before deciding whether to
initiate a lawsuit under the FCA or to intervene in a qui tam lawsuit….”);
Laura Laemmie-Weidenfeld & Michael Schaengold, Feature Comment: The
Impact of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 On the Civil
False Claims Act, 51 GC ¶ 224; New Legislation Aims to Toughen FCA,
Anti-Fraud Laws, 51 GC ¶ 151; Steven L. Briggerman, False Claims Act
Amendments: A Major Expansion in the Scope of the Act, 23 N&CR ¶ 58;
Agencies Face Challenges Implementing Recovery Act Provisions, IGS Say,
51 GC ¶ 145; Ralph C. Nash, Suspension and Debarment: Protecting the
Government By Denying Due Process to Contractors, 23 N&CR ¶ 36, discussing, Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and
Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including
a Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and
Other Noteworthy Developments, 38 Pub. Cont. L.J. 547 (2009); Steven L.
Briggerman, The Demise of Voluntary Government Contract Compliance
and Disclosure Programs: The New Requirement, 23 N&CR ¶ 11.
Particularly given the perceived failure of the free market in the
financial and mortgage industries, contractors increasingly are vilified,
and resources are shifted from pursuing value-based outcomes to creating compliance and risk avoidance regimes. That may be understandable,
but, at a macro level, it is an inefficient over-reaction. The United States
enjoys one of the world’s best public procurement regimes. Government
customers enjoy excellent value for taxpayer money. Contractors provide
extraordinary levels of support, particularly in extreme conditions such
as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Quite simply, there are significant costs associated with sophisticated
rule-based procurement regimes, their resulting compliance programs, and
the audit, oversight, and prosecutorial functions required to validate and
sustain them. While a successful procurement regime depends upon high
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standards of integrity and compliance, a pervasive “corruption control”
focus not only stifles creativity and encourages mechanical rule adherence, but encourages timidity and risk-averse behavior. Steve Kelman
hits close to the mark in fretting that public managers (or procurement
professionals) over the next decade:
[r]ather than transforming, learning, and challenging themselves
… could be preoccupied with ‘ferreting’ out waste, fraud and
abuse, … ‘exposing mismanagement’, … ‘complying with rules
and procedures’ … in a mode of ‘hunkering down’ and ‘keeping
out of trouble[.]’

Donald Kettl & Steven Kelman, Reflections on 21st Century Government
Management, IBM Center for the Business of Government, www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/KettlKelmanReport.pdf. That can’t be the
procurement regime our government aspires to foster.
VIII. PROFESSIONALISM, ETHICS, AND COMMON SENSE
We remain surprised, disappointed, and, ultimately flummoxed by
the increasing message that government acquisition professionals have
heard from their leadership and ethics advisors: specifically, that participation – and even membership – in relevant professional development
organizations may run afoul of government ethics rules. This advice is
not only wrong, but wrong-headed. And the timing – as the government
attempts to recruit the next generation of acquisition professionals – could
not be worse. Fortunately, the National Contract Management Association
(NCMA) sought advice of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) and DoD’s
director of standards of conduct (SOCO). The result is an Open Letter to
Government Employees: Becoming Engaged with NCMA Enhances Professionalism and Mission Success (November 7, 2009), available at www.
ncmahq.org/News/CMNewsDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=6293. (“NCMA …
provide[s a] … neutral environment where professionals from government and industry can come together to discuss, analyze, and advance
the state of the contract management profession.”) Hopefully, this effort
will remove doubt that government employees may (1) become members
of NCMA; (2) attend and participate in educational NCMA conferences,
workshops, or meetings; (3) participate in the management of NCMA
at the local or national level; (4) present an educational briefing to an
NCMA conference, workshop, or meeting, (5) “use … government e-mail
for simple communications ([although] not … endorsement[s]) to forward
announcements of NCMA educational events since such announcements
serve the common interests of government acquisition professionals in a
manner that is consistent with DOD Joint Ethics Regulation paragraph
3-208[,]” and (6) accept cash awards under awards programs administered by NCMA. Of course: “OGE went on to say that there may indeed
be circumstances where it would be wise for individual employees to seek
legal advice regarding unique circumstances applicable to their particular
professional responsibilities.”
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